# 1nc

## off

### 1

#### Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend an expansion of the scope of the United States core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate each of the above words’ requirements of government action

#### 2 impacts

#### 1---iterative education. Debate is unique because of the near-infinite iteration of limited arguments over the course of a season that forces debaters to improve their arguments and consider a “narrow superposition” of approaches to a limited issue. Every debater is here for different reasons, but they trace back to the pedagogical uniqueness of the space. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

#### 2---fairness--- non-topical advocacies monopolize argumentative ground and allow the affirmative to unilaterally determine negative positions – it creates a competitive incentive to give the neg the worst ground and the aff the best – this comes before evaluating the substance of the aff because it’s a procedural question

### 2

#### The politics of survival and self-mastery produces auto-immunity; that prevents effective challenge of capitalism

Cheah 11 — Professor of Rhetoric at Berkley (Pheng, “Crisis of Money,” in Françoise Lionnet and Shu-mei Shih (Eds.) *Creolization of Theory*, p. 102-108)

My point here is that the drive and imperative for speculative profit making not only animates foreign currency speculators and portfolio investors but operates in the very heart of industrializing Asian economies. It is the very spirit of financial globalization, which will always favor capital flows that can be withdrawn instantaneously, because patience is not a virtue of hyperprofitability. Once this imperative has set in, private-sector interests in developing countries will desire the rapid development of capital markets as the fast and easy track to making large sums of money. Even if the developmental state tries to stem rapid capital outflow now and then, the state will not and cannot stop outflow in the long run, not only because the state's strength is based on market-opening progress but also because in the official drive toward national economic productivity, it has inculcated the imperative for hyperprofitability in the people through various technologies of biopower. Training into consumerism through rising standards of living, and the proliferation of new needs and desires through the global culture industry and media advertising, are other means for the inculcation of this imperative. In the final analysis, the distinction between productive and nonproductive forms of capital dogmatically assumes the purity of the people and forecloses how the people were formed and constituted by technologies of biopower and cultural and ideological instruments to actively want these capital inflows. Simply denouncing the political and economic corruption of the indigenous elite as the internal neuralgic point that makes the nation vulnerable to speculative and nonproductive forms of foreign capital obscures the constitutive relation between state and people in these regions. For instance, why do most of these corrupt regimes remain in power even after the financial crash? Why does business largely continue as usual after the crisis has waned? As important as it is to attribute responsibility to external forces such as currency speculators and the IMP's and World Bank's neoliberal economic policies, finger-pointing and economic-nationalist sentiment can also hinder the more difficult task of coming to terms with how both statist and popular elements within the affected countries were also responsible for the conditions that generated the crisis. Strictly speaking, such an accounting of responsibility for the crisis wrought by financial globalization can no longer assume that it is a form of trauma. Despite surface similarities to colonial trauma such as the crisis's systemic or structural character and its origins in material political and economic conditions at the national and transnational level, the power and politics of global money cannot be understood in terms of the breaching of a protective barrier. In global financialization, money is not merely a force of destruction (Destructionkraft), as Marx claimed (Marx and Engels 1932/1970, 59; 94). It is also clearly productive in ways that go beyond Marx's understanding of production. There is no longer any barrier separating the inside from the outside because from the start, national economies are actively opened up by their states to the outside. Transnational capital flows fabricate the economic well-being of these collective subjects and their individual citizens from the start. It makes no sense to speak of trauma unless trauma is no longer pathological and the result of an external imposition but a normal state of existence, a power that is operative from the start, at the origin. Within this framework, we need to distinguish between the different modalities of constitutive exposure and their levels of operation: first, at the macrologicallevel of global political economy, states undertake aggressive policy initiatives to open up their markets and attract foreign capital. As Saskia Sassen has argued, the state's active internalization of the legal, eco- nomic, and managerial rules, standards, and concepts required for crossborder business transactions and capital mobility within the framework of international finance and corporate services leads to its partial denationalization, since it is effectively welcoming its own disciplining by transnational legal and corporate regimes (Sassen 1998, 200 ). Second, at the level of the biopolitical production of the individual and the population, techniques of discipline and government craft the bodies of individuals as bodies capable of work and create their needs and interests as members of a population. Third, at the level of social reproduction, global mass-consumer culture also leads to the proliferation of sophisticated consumer needs and desires. These processes prepare the ground in which the desire for hyperprofit and the speculative drive can take root in individuals. They constitute the conditions of possibility of the political and economic self-determination and sovereignty of collective subjects and the self-mastery and security of individual subjects. At the same time, this condition of possibility of strength and power also implies a radical vulnerability. The physiology of power of financial globalization differs from the colonial model of power presupposed by postcolonial cultural critique in at least two ways. First, it does not work through external imposition or impingement on a preexisting subject. Second, it does not operate in the first instance at a mental, psychical, or ideational level, even though it prepares the ground for processes of ideological subject formation to take root. Marxist categories of analysis such as alienation, ideology, and reification still have an explanatory value provided that we understand the reification of consciousness (Lukacs) as originary rather than something that befalls the subject under conditions of alienation, since the laboring subject of needs is itself a product -effect and not an original ground that subsequently becomes alienated. I would like to suggest that this physiology of power and its violent consequences should be understood not through the motif of trauma but in terms of what Jacques Derrida called in his final writings "auto-immunity." Autoimmunization is a perversion of the process of immunity. In immunization, a body protects itself by producing antibodies to combat foreign antigens. In autoimmunization, however, the organism protects "itself against its self-protection by destroying its own immune system" (Derrida 1998, 731127). Autoimmunization is therefore a form of suicide where the organism immunizes itself against its own immunity?0 The autoimmune or sui cidal character of hyperdevelopment through globalization lies in the fact that the constitution of the self's very selfhood requires the exposure of the self to the alterity and heteronomy of capital flows. In defending itself against this other, the self is doing nothing other than compromising its own selfhood, since its selfhood comes from the other. In Derrida's words, "The autoimmune consists not only in harming or ruining oneself, indeed in destroying one's own protections, and in doing so oneself, committing suicide or threatening to do so .... It consists not only in compromising oneself (s(mto-entamer) but in compromising the self, the autos-and thus ipseity. It consists not only in committing suicide but in compromising sui- or selfreferentiality, the self or sui- of suicide itself. Autoimmunity is more or less suicidal, but, more seriously still, it threatens always to rob suicide itself of its meaning and supposed integrity" (Derrida 2oosb, 45). I have written at length elsewhere on the autoimmune character of postcolonial national culture (Bildung) as the opening up of the body to the supplementation of an image (Bild) (Cheah 2003). I conclude here with a brief outline of the autoimmune character of development through foreign capital and the cultivation of human capital. Financial flows are autoimmune processes. On the one hand, inflows of money strengthen the well-being of the national economy and are therefore a source of power and security that can be drawn on in self-defense against any external threats. On the other hand, however, since this integrates the nation into a circuit of capital market processes where other actors who have even more money can attack and weaken the nation through currency speculation, what is medicine is also poison. Hence this constitutive alterity needs to be divided into two so that the self can provisionally act in defense of itself, to protect itself against this other that is also in fact itself. Hence, in the Malaysian case, capital controls were established and justified through Prime Minister Mahathir's pious distinction between immoral forms of capital flows that lead to abnormal economic activity such as currency trading, short selling, and trading with borrowed shares and other forms of speculation, which are "unnecessary, unproductive and immoral" because they do not finance any real trade, and moral and productive forms of financial flows that contribute to the real economy. Bad flows of money are manipulative. They lead to "no tangible benefit for the world ... . No substantial jobs are created, not products or services enjoyed by average people . ... Their profits come from impoverish- ing others. Southeast Asians have become the targets because we have the money but not enough to defend ourselves." 2 ' Mahathir superimposes this moralistic distinction onto a Euro-American imperialist conspiracy against developing Asia: "But now we know better. We know that economies of developing countries can be suddenly manipulated and forced to bow to the great fund managers who decide who should prosper and who should not" (quoted in Gill1997, 124). But this obscures the point that any given state of global economic hegemony is sustained by the power of capital flows, and that all financial flows and profits, whether they come from production or speculation, involve exploitation. But at the same time, and this is the real meaning of the crisis, there does not seem to be any way out of this circuit of exploitation. The long-term solution that is invariably suggested is sustainable development through the cultivation of human capital through state education policies. Here is the politically correct advice of the World Bank based on focus group results from Indonesia and the Philippines on schooling for the poor: Beyond the crisis, the education system will shape the region's future workforce and the competitiveness of its economies. Sustaining high quality and broad-based educational expansion is central to equipping workers with the skills for high productivity manufacturing and service industries and to train them over the course of a working life .... Institutional and policy reforms are required to foster the high quality schooling which includes the skills that will propel East Asian countries into the knowledge economy of the next century. (World Bank 1998b, 290) Here we hit against the autoimmune character of governmentality. Governmental technologies build human capital to strengthen the national economy. But in so doing, education's primary function is also reduced to the government of human resources in the interests of creating a more efficient and intelligent pool of commodified labor for the global economy. Yet, as the example of the East Asian model of development illustrates, this is the only way to ascend the hierarchy of the international division of labor. Unless we can somehow leap out of the networks and circuits of capitalist globalization, the inflow of foreign capital is something that no developing country in the postcolonial South cannot not want. Since we are all inextricably woven into and implicated within the web of the productive power and politics of money, postcolonial cultural critique should at least begin by questioning the continuing dominance of the colonial paradigm of power as an external imposition. This is not to say that this type of power no longer exists. It clearly does. But it is no longer the main modality and form of power in contemporary globalization. One fundamental task of postcolonial critique would be to interminably track the autoimmune processes of finance capital at every turn, looking at how and when the medicine can become poison in the interest of postponing or stalling these noxious effects and lengthening the respite of postcolonial nations outside the OECD so that, hopefully, they can become as powerful as possible within the rules of this new game of power. At the same time, the consequences and effects of any increase in power for a given postcolonial nation-state within the international division of labor also need to be interminably circumscribed, because the strengthening of a state necessarily leads to the further instrumentalization and exploitation of its own citizens, especially marginalized minorities, and other peoples.

#### Capital exploitation is the master trope of education — the focus anywhere else leaves the root of exploitation in place

Carlson 14 — Professor of education leadership at Miami University (Ohio) (Dennis, “Leaving children behind: Urban education, class politics, and the machines of transnational capitalism.” *Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor*, No. 11, p. 121-122, Emory Libraries)

Conclusion

5.1 Schools exist within semiotic economies, and to study them in isolation of these economies of power and knowledge is like studying a fish out of water. So I have sought to "see" and analyze some of that water in this narration of a project in urban school renewal, and acknowledge its force and power in shaping the urban school landscape. Ironically, the current hegemonic discourse in urban school renewal, which is part of that water, is involved in not seeing it, in riveting our attention upon individual schools as the causal agents in explaining student achievement levels. It thus serves to shift attention away from broader discourses, structures, and technologies of domination and inequality that are involved in the social production of underachievement among urban youth. "Action research" projects which focus on a decontextualized, ahistorical treatment of the change process in one school also serve to blind us. They make us think schools are more open and less determined than they actually are. They make us think that all we need to do is restructure the system one school at a time. The hope that the shift to a more decentralized site-based form of labor might open up significant space within individual urban schools for democratic work has thus not been fulfilled. 5.2 There is, to be sure, some room in urban schools serving socioeconomically marginalized youth for what Lois Weis and Michelle Fine (2001) call "possibilities of interruption," practices that call into question the taken for granted reform discourse and at least partially interrupt the reproductive role of urban schooling. But the gap between these "possibilities of interruption" and a fundamental democratic renewal of public education is great. Wherever there is power, there is resistance. However, for that resistance to become transformative in a democratic sense, it needs to be linked to social movements and discourses "outside" the school, and to histories of progressive struggle in American public life. Ultimately, progressives will need to articulate a powerful new "common sense" as part of a process of forging a new power bloc for the renewal of democratic education and public life. In the process, they will need to take on the machines and micro-technologies of transnational capitalism, along with those associated with the policing and surveillance of urban youth. 5.3 Progressives will also need to learn how to tell new kinds of stories about what goes on in urban schools. This does not mean that their stories are deliberate distortions and falsifications of events, nor fictions that take creative liberty with reality. But educational researchers are storytellers to the extent that they are actively engaged in producing certain truths about what goes on in schools and other educational sites, framing events according to particular discourses or interpretive lenses (Richardson, 2000). In the academy, different scholarly discourses and traditions allow us to tell different kinds of stories. Of course, discourses are also open and ever-changing as new storytellers revise and rescript older narratives. Occasionally, something like a new story might even emerge out of this process. As storytellers, educational researchers and scholars also cannot avoid questions having to do with the moral of their story; and this leads to questions about the purpose of the story. Why did this story get written? What use does it serve in advancing a particular set of interests or agendas in education? How does the story enter into battles being waged over the course and direction of public education and public life? In my view, it is important to tell stories that are honest in the sense that they confront us with the real and significant forces that currently stand in the way of a meaningful democratization of urban schools serving poor, Black, Latino/Latina, and White youth. 5.4 Such stories may help individuals and groups deconstruct the beliefs and practices that keep them oppressed or disempowered, and face the reality of their situation. Currently that reality is that transnational capitalism plays an ever-increasing role in establishing the semiotic systems for the articulation of educational policy and practice, and public schools (particularly urban public schools) are being called upon to assume a heightened role in the surveillance, policing, and regulation of "problem youth." If there can be no illusions about the challenge progressives face in reconstructing public education along more democratic and liberatory lines, progressive stories can be useful in formulating counter-narratives and counter-movements that are potentially liberatory. In this regard they can help recover hope and possibility rooted in recognition that culture is contested and thus open rather than determined. Progressive stories can open up possibilities for critical reflection and strategic action at various sites, and they can help develop linkages between various movements, alliances, and axes of struggle to bring progressives together around at least a strategic united front politics (Apple, 2001; Carlson, 2002; Dimitriadis and Carlson, 2003; Giroux, 1997; McLaren, 1995; Watkins, 2001; Weis and Fine, 2001). 5.5 To tell these kinds of useful stories of hope without illusion, progressives will need to deconstruct yet another one of those binaries that has limited them as storytellers that which separates "insider" and "outsider" perspectives. Outsider stories most often have been told by those who identity with the foundations of education with its links to sociology, history, and philosophy. As social or psychological scientists, albeit not of the positivist sort, critical scholars seek to bring the everyday life-world or "lebenswelt" under the gaze of a detached, phenomenological rationality, a rationality of "bracketing" the commonsense beliefs of the life-world and stepping outside of that world to view it from a critical distance. The role of the intellectual in general, and the researcher more particularly, is to cultivate the craft of becoming an outsider, an enlightened outsider, who presumably sees things more clearly and rationally than insiders. As outsiders to the everyday world of the school, critical researchers generally have interpreted that world through a macro-theory of schooling. In the 1970s and 1980s, more often than not, that macro-theory of schooling was one variation or another of a structural Marxist theory of cultural and economic reproduction (Althusser, 1971; Bowles and Gintis, 1976). This macro-theory of schooling served as a useful template for interpreting what went on in particular school and classroom sites, for revealing how the formal curriculum and the hidden curriculum reproduced dominant ideologies and worldviews, and for showing how the process of schooling socialized young people into the work norms of advanced capitalism. Resistance was acknowledged in these stories about what goes on in schools and classroom sites, but it was a resistance that was represented as largely contained and self-defeating, as individualized and depoliticized (McRobbie, 2000; Willis, 1977). I want to be very careful not to dismiss these critical research stories as useless or "untrue." On the contrary, they have played an important role in helping progressives think beyond the limits of liberalism and to confront the real barriers that stand in the way of a democratic reconstruction of public education. They did so by making it clear that public schools are not autonomous sites of action and strong pressures exist to make the schools serve basically reproductive roles. At the same time, outsider stories, framed by a structural, macro-theory of school, almost inevitably represented the micro-reality of the school as more determined and less open than it really is. As a result, outsider stories often reinforce a cynicism about the possibilities for working for democratic change in public schools.

#### Capitalism causes inequality, dehumanization, and extinction

McLaren & Scatamburlo-D'Annibale 4 — Peter McLaren (Education and Urban Schooling Division professor at UCLA); Valerie Scatamburlo-D'Annibale (University of Windsor, Educational Philosophy and Theory), Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, [www.freireproject.org/articles/node%2065/RCGS/class\_dismissed-val-peter.10.pdf](http://www.freireproject.org/articles/node%2065/RCGS/class_dismissed-val-peter.10.pdf)

For example, E. San Juan (2003) argues that race relations and race conﬂict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modiﬁcations in the structure of the world economy. He further notes that the capitalist mode of production has articulated ‘race’ with class in a peculiar way. He too is worth a substantial quotation: While the stagnation of rural life imposed a racial or castelike rigidity to the peasantry, the rapid accumulation of wealth through the ever more intensifying exploitation of labor by capital could not so easily ‘racialize’ the wage-workers of a particular nation, given the alienability of labor power — unless certain physical or cultural characteristics can be utilized to divide the workers or render one group an outcast or pariah removed from the domain of ‘free labor.’ In the capitalist development of U.S. society, African, Mexican, and Asian bodies — more precisely, their labor power and its reproductive efﬁcacy — were colonized and racialized; hence the idea of ‘internal colonialism’ retains explanatory validity. ‘Race’ is thus constructed out of raw materials furnished by class relations, the history of class conﬂicts, and the vicissitudes of colonial/capitalist expansion and the building of imperial hegemony. It is dialecticallyaccented and operationalized not just to differentiate the price of wagelabor within and outside the territory of the metropolitan power, but alsoto reproduce relations of domination–subordination invested with an auraof naturality and fatality. The refunctioning of physical or cultural traits as ideological and political signiﬁers of class identity reiﬁes social relations. Such ‘racial’ markers enter the ﬁeld of the alienated laborprocess, concealing the artiﬁcial nature of meanings and norms, and essentializing or naturalizing historical traditions and values which are contingent on mutable circumstances. For San Juan, racism and nationalism are modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history. He argues thatracism arose with thecreation and expansion of the capitalist world economy. He maintains, rightly in our view, that racial or ethnic group solidarity is given ‘meaning and value in terms of theirplace within the social organization ofproduction and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these “racial” solidarities’. It is remarkable, in our opinion, that so much of contemporary social theory has largely abandoned the problems of labor, capitalist exploitation, and class analysis at a time when capitalism is becoming more universal, more ruthless and more deadly. The metaphor of a contemporary ‘tower of Babel’ seems appropriate here — academics striking radical poses in the seminar rooms while remaining oblivious to the possibility that their seemingly radical discursive maneuvers do nothing to further the struggles ‘against oppression and exploitation which continue to be real, material, and not merely “discursive” problems of the contemporary world’ (Dirlik, 1997, p. 176). Harvey (1998, pp. 29–31) indicts the new academic entrepreneurs, the ‘masters of theory-in-and-for-itself’ whose ‘discourse radicalism’ has deftly side-stepped ‘the enduring conundrums of class struggle’ and who have, against a ‘sobering background of cheapened discourse and opportunistic politics,’ been ‘stripped of their self-advertised radicalism.’ For years, they ‘contested socialism,’ ridiculed Marxists, and promoted ‘their own alternative theories of liberatory politics’ but now they have largely been ‘reduced to the role of supplicants in the most degraded form of pluralist politics imaginable.’ As they pursue the politics of difference, the ‘class war rages unabated’ and they seem ‘either unwilling or unable to focus on the unprecedented economic carnage occurring around the globe.’ Harvey’s searing criticism suggests that post-Marxists have been busy ﬁddling while Rome burns and his comments echo those made by Marx (1978, p. 149) in his critique of the Young Hegelians who were, ‘in spite of their allegedly “worldshattering” statements, the staunchest conservatives.’ Marx lamented that the Young Hegelians were simply ﬁghting ‘phrases’ and that they failed to acknowledge that in offering only counter-phrases, they were in no way ‘combating the real existing world’ but merely combating the phrases of the world. Taking a cue from Marx and substituting ‘phrases’ with ‘discourses’ or ‘resigniﬁcations’ we would contend that the practitioners of difference politics who operate within exaggerated culturalist frameworks that privilege the realm of representation as the primary arena of political struggle question some discourses of power while legitimating others. Moreover, because they lack a class perspective, their gestures of radicalism are belied by their own class positions.10 As Ahmad (1997a, p. 104) notes: One may speak of any number of disorientations and even oppressions, but one cultivates all kinds of politeness and indirection about the structure of capitalist class relations in which those oppressions are embedded. To speak of any of that directly and simply is to be ‘vulgar.’ In this climate of Aesopian languages it is absolutely essential to reiterate that most things are a matter of class. That kind of statement is … surprising only in a culture like that of the North American university … But it is precisely in that kind of culture that people need to hear such obvious truths. Ahmad’s provocative observations imply that substantive analyses of the carnage wrought by ‘globalized’ class exploitation have, for the most part, been marginalized by the kind of radicalism that has been instituted among the academic Left in North America. He further suggests that while various post-Marxists have invited us to join their euphoric celebrations honoring the decentering of capitalism, the abandonment of class politics, and the decline of metanarratives (particularly those of Marxism and socialism), they have failed to see that the most ‘meta of all metanarratives of the past three centuries, the creeping annexation of the globe for the dominance of capital over laboring humanity has met, during those same decades, with stunning success’ (Ahmad, 1997b, p. 364). As such, Ahmad invites us to ask anew, the proverbial question: What, then, must be done? To this question we offer no simple theoretical, pedagogical or political prescriptions. Yet we would argue that if social change is the aim, progressive educators and theorists must cease displacing class analysis with the politics of difference. Conclusion … we will take our stand against the evils (of capitalism, imperialism, and racism) with a solidarity derived from a proletarian internationalism born of socialist idealism. — National Ofﬁce of the Black Panther Party, February 1970 For well over two decades we have witnessed the jubilant liberal and conservative pronouncements of the demise of socialism. Concomitantly, history’s presumed failure to defang existing capitalist relations has been read by many self-identiﬁed ‘radicals’ as an advertisement for capitalism’s inevitability. As a result, the chorus refrain ‘There Is No Alternative’, sung by liberals and conservatives, has been buttressed by the symphony of post-Marxist voices recommending that we give socialism a decent burial and move on. Within this context, to speak of the promise of Marx and socialism may appear anachronistic, even naïve, especially since the post-al intellectual vanguard has presumably demonstrated the folly of doing so. Yet we stubbornly believe that the chants of T.I.N.A. must be combated for they offer as a fait accompli, something which progressive Leftists should refuse to accept — namely the triumph of capitalism and its political bedfellow neo-liberalism, which have worked together to naturalize suffering, undermine collective struggle, and obliterate hope. We concur with Amin (1998), who claims that such chants must be deﬁed and revealed as absurd and criminal, and who puts the challenge we face in no uncertain terms: humanity may let itself be led by capitalism’s logic to a fate of collective suicide or it may pave the way for an alternative humanist project of global socialism. The grosteque conditions that inspired Marx to pen his original critique of capitalism are present and ﬂourishing. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx’s day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global capitalism has paved the way for the obscene concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands and created a world increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent afﬂuence and those who languish in dehumanizing conditions and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world’s population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately 2.8 billion people — almost half of the world’s population — struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as 250 million children are wage slaves and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-employed. These are the concrete realities of our time — realities that require a vigorous class analysis, an unrelenting critique of capitalism and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along with Lenin’s corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justiﬁcation; nonetheless Marx did provide us with fundamental insights into class society that have held true to this day. Marx’s enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While capitalism’s cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx’s description of capitalism as the sorcerer’s dark power is even more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather than jettisoning Marx, decentering the role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage Marx’s oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful pedagogically, theoretically, and, most importantly, politically in light of the challenges that confront us.

#### Only a criticism of capitalism allows for an understanding of all oppression; free-market logic transforms individuals into ‘Nobodys’, which creates conditions for state violence

Hill 16 — Marc Lamont (Distinguished Professor of African American Studies at Morehouse College), *Nobody, Casualties of America’s War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond*, p. 17-20)

To be Nobody is to be abandoned by the State. For decades now, we have witnessed a radical transformation in the role and function of government in America. An obsession with free-market logic and culture has led the political class to craft policies that promote private interests over the public good. As a result, our schools, our criminal justice system, our military, our police departments, our public policy, and virtually every other entity engineered to protect life and enhance prosperity have been at least partially relocated to the private sector. At the same time, the private sector has kept its natural commitment to maximizing profits rather than investing in people. This arrangement has left the nation’s vulnerable wedged between the Scylla of negligent government and the Charybdis of corporate greed, trapped in a historically unprecedented state of precarity. To be Nobody is to be considered disposable. In New Orleans, we saw the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina followed by a grossly unnatural government response, one that killed thousands of vulnerable citizens and consigned many more to refugee status. In Flint, Michigan, we are witnessing this young century’s most profound illustration of civic evil, an entire city collectively punished with lead-poisoned water for the crime of being poor, Black, and politically disempowered. Every day, the nation’s homeless, mentally ill, drug addicted, and poor are pushed out of institutions of support and relocated to jails and prisons. These conditions reflect a prevailing belief that the vulnerable are unworthy of investment, protection, or even the most fundamental provisions of the social contract. As a result, they can be erased, abandoned, and even left to die. Without question, Nobodyness is largely indebted to race, as White supremacy is foundational to the American democratic experiment. The belief that White lives are worth more than others — what Princeton University scholar Eddie Glaude calls the “value gap” — continues to color every aspect of our public and private lives.1 This belief likewise compromises the lives of vulnerable White citizens, many of who support political movements and policies that close ranks around Whiteness rather than ones that enhance their own social and economic interests. While Nobodyness is strongly tethered to race, it cannot be divorced from other forms of social injustice. Instead, it must be understood through the lens of “intersectionality,” the ways that multiple forms of oppression operate simultaneously against the vulnerable.2 It would be impossible to example the 2014 killing of Mya Hall by National Security Agency police without understanding how sexism and transphobia conspire with structural racism to endanger Black trans bodies. We cannot make sense of Sandra Bland’s tragic death without recognizing the impact of gender and poverty in shaping the current carceral state. To understand the complexity of oppression, we must avoid simple solutions and singular answers. Despite the centrality of race within American life, Nobodyness cannot be understood without an equally thorough analysis of class. Unlike other forms of difference, class creates the material conditions and relations through which racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression are produced, sustained, and lived. This does not mean that all forms of injustice are due to class antagonism, nor does it mean that all forms of domination can be automatically fixed through universal class struggle. Rather, it means that we cannot begin to address the various forms of oppression experienced by America’s vulnerable without radically changing a system that defends class at all costs. This book is my attempt to tell these stories of those marked as Nobody. Based on extensive research, as well as my time on the ground — in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York City, Atlanta, Hempstead, Flint, and Sanford — I want to show how the high-profile and controversial cases of State violence that we’ve witnessed over the past few years are but a symptom of a deeper American problem. Underneath each case is a more fundamental set of economic conditions, political arrangements, and power relations that transforms everyday citizens into casualties of an increasingly intense war on the vulnerable. It is my hope that this book offers an analysis that spotlights the humanity of these “Nobodies” and inspires principled action.

#### The alternative is to endorse pragmatic demands upon the state towards an anti-capitalist project — that opens space for radicalism; their strategy cedes political potential to violent forces

Harvey 15 — David Harvey (Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York), “Consolidating Power,” *Roar*, Issue #0, p. 16, Fall 2015, <https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power/>)

So, looking at examples from southern Europe — solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey — these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach? I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation. There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement — and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance. That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized? To begin with, the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city — like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization. There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly important — the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization. There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone. One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics. From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making. Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’

So you believe this would require some form of authority?

No, there will be authority structures anyway — there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here — but it’s covert.’Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation? At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option. I think — and I hate to say this — but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now.

More pragmatic in what sense?

Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me. It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place. For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism — because in some ways Podemos originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure. The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party in Parliament. This also goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power back. What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of neoliberalism in this way? There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the question of the big donors who set the agenda — which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state. This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very different political status. But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state? Well there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system in its entirety. This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no collective or common project. This connects to the very first question you raised: there is no coordination of what the political objectives are. And the danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it. For example, Occupy Sandy helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should have done. The end of history seems to have passed already. Looking at the actual conditions and concrete examples of anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option? Definitely, and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives. The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive of some of this stuff and I think they are wrong. But at the same time I don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. Here we talk about nothing less than a state. So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus.

## Case

### Contingency---1nc

#### Anti-blackness is mutable.

Kelley, 17—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE>, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

#### Society is shaped by human choices and relationships---ontological notions of racism are littered with contradictions and entrench anti-black racism by accepting failure before even trying to alter power relations.

\*Black people must’ve been humans in the first place to have their humanity denied

\*Afro pessimism relies on white people denying their relation to black people, but one must be in relation to blackness in order to define it

\*don’t allow white people to define social death

\*power is contingent and should be studied instead of assuming ontology

\*they make anti-blackness self-sustaining and non-relational which calcifies historical resistance

\*they assume ontology before it actually occurs

\*we should not make a-priori assertions on reality either way

\*the social world is a manifestation of choices and relationships (human actions) which means it is contingent and can be altered

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The problem with addressing a problem in terms of bad faith is that its exemplars would immediately seek to defend themselves. Bad faith, as many who have studied the phenomenon know, is ashamed of itself and thus attempts to hide from itself often through shifting the orientation of critique (Gordon, 1995/1999; Sartre, 1943). Thus, the defense is on the alert for analyses of bad faith to be in bad faith. Much of this has to do with the negative associations of the word ‘bad’ and the legalistic meaning of ‘bad faith’ in the English language. Thus, I prefer simply to use the French term mauvaise-foi. Mauvaise-foi has its negative connotations in French, but its range is broader in usage than in English, just as Geist in German doesn’t exactly mean ‘spirit’ or ‘mind’ as it is often translated into English.

The aforementioned list of hegemonic theorists of the study of race and gender in the mid-1990s reflects the domination of three approaches: (1) poststructuralism, (2) Marxism, and (3) liberal political theory primarily in the form of analytical political philosophy. Existentialism and phenomenology were not only being treated as passé but also as incompatible with each other. There was also the problem of ‘compartmentalism’ and ‘disciplinary decadence’, two tendencies that continue to be features of not only much race theory but also most disciplinary practices in the academy. The former offered disciplines under a separate but equal rule, which, if history has taught us anything about such formulations, is never actually so. The latter sought methodological conquest. These constrained what one could talk about when it came to human matters and how one is supposed to do it. I eventually developed a formulation of the second: ‘methodological fetishism’ (Gordon, 2016). Poststructuralism, Marxism, and analytical philosophy in the form of liberal political philosophy exemplified this tendency. One could add continental philosophy to this, which was in fact another way of saying ‘Euro-continental philosophy’. It, however, became, and for the most part continues to be, dominated by poststructualism and, relatedly, hermeneutics or theories of interpretation. A form of cart before the horse was the result, where fetishized methods were being imposed on reality instead of constructing relationships with it. As should be apparent at this point, disciplinary decadence is a form of mauvaise-foi (Gordon, 2006, 2012, 2016). The similarity to Sartre’s famous formulation of the fallacy of placing essence before existence in the study of human reality also comes to the fore (Sartre, 1943, 1946). This is particularly ironic with regard to poststructuralism since its approach is patently anti-essentialist (Caws, 1992; Gordon, 2012).

Mauvaise-foi emerged not only at the level of human phenomena in action but also at the ways in which they are studied. For instance, the compartmentalist approach of separating race away from other dimensions of human reality distorts the subject at hand. It could only be done, ultimately, in mauvaise-foi because of the imposition of non-relationality on a relational subject (Gordon, 2010, 2016). The old debate of race versus gender, or race versus class, or gender versus class, and any of these versus sexual orientation is a fine intellectual exercise under laboratory conditions in which the domain of inquiry is staked out and constrained. That, however, is not human reality. Typically, we (human beings) don’t ‘see’ race, gender, class, or sexual orientation walking around; we exemplify, coextensively, all of these, all the time, in different ways. Imagine the hyphenated version class-gender-race-sexuality (and more) with emphasis on different words at different times. Focus is not identical with elimination. Race for me, then, was and continues to be studied in relation to what made it, among other related phenomena, emerge as a reality of human life over the past several hundred years (Gordon, 1995/1999, 1995, 2006, 2010).

There is a simple version of my argument from those years: Racism requires denying the humanity of other groups of human beings through the organization of them, through regimes of power, under the category of a race and then denying the ascription of human being to them. The performative contradiction is that they would first have to be identified as human beings in order to deny their being such. It is thus a form of mauvaise-foi. Since racism is a form of mauvaise-foi, antiblack racism, as a species of racism, must also be a form of mauvaise-foi.

My seemingly simple argument had complicated theoretical consequences. How did such performative contradictions historically emerge? People were not always categorized under races. Gender and linguistic membership predated many racial concepts (Gordon, 1997). Many other examples, such as religious membership, location in an economy, and even specialized skills could be added to the mix.

One approach is to look at the concepts informing dehumanization. They depend on a particular idea of human beings at work in racist practices. An obvious feature of racism is the rejection of having relationships with members of certain races. Non-relationality has many implications. For one, the notion that one could exist without relations with others (a slippery slope leading to being without relations) requires a model of the self as self-sustaining ‘substance’. That model has dominated much of market-oriented Euromodern thought, especially those in the Anglophone world. My writings could be read as a critique of this notion. Consider any act of studying a phenomenon. Such an effort cannot be done without establishing at least a relationship with something as a focus of study. This doesn’t involve eliminating one’s relationship to reality but instead reorienting oneself to relevant acts of knowing, learning, and understanding (Gordon, 1995, 2010, 2012, 2016). Commitment to the elimination of relations leads to contradictions. Try, for instance, eliminating relations to oneself. Mauvaise foi returns in many forms as each displeasing truth about relations is denied for the sake of pleasing falsehoods. In the chain of efforts, other important elements of study such as communicability, evidence, and sociality come to the fore, each of which raises concerns of the self as other.

As I focused primarily on antiblack racism, the question of whether all other forms of racism are the same emerged. Blackness functions, after all, in peculiar ways in societies that have produced antiblack racism. A response to the #BlackLivesMatter movement, for instance, is often that ‘all lives matter’. That is true the extent to which each group lives under conditions of equal respect for life. What advocates of #BlackLivesMatter are doing, however, is responding to a world in which some lives matter a lot more than others, whose lives evidentially matter a lot less. The history of antiblack racism amounts to the conviction that black people are only valuable the extent to which there is use for their labor or, worse, profiting from their misfortune as we see with the heavily racialized prison industrial complexes in the United States and similar countries (Alexander, 2010; Davis, 1983, 2005). It collapses into the expectation of justified existence in a context in which the justification for whoever stands as most valued is intrinsic. Members of the dominant group could thus seek their justification – if they wish – personally, through mechanisms of love, professional recognition, athletic achievement, etc. Moreover, that such society renders some groups as positive and others as negative leads to notions of legitimate presence (illegitimate absence) and absence (illegitimate presence). Should the analysis remain at white and black, the world would, however, appear more closed than it in fact is. For one, simply being born black would bar the possibility of any legitimate appearance. This is a position that has been taken by a growing group of theorists known as ‘Afropessimists’, for whom ‘black’ signifies absolute ‘social death’ (Sexton, 2010, 2011; Wilderson, 2007, 2008, 2009). It is, in other words, outside of relations. My objections to this view are many. For one, no human being is ‘really’ any of these things. Do blacks, for instance, suffer social death in relation to each other? The project of making people into such is one thing. The achievement of such is another. This is an observation Fanon also makes in his formulation of the zone of nonbeing and his critique of otherness in the study of race in Black Skin, White Masks, which I discuss at length my (Gordon, 2015) study, What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought.

Fanon (1952) is critical of how otherness is interpreted in race theories and the study of race. The rejection of otherness ignores the fact that others are human beings. Racism emerges in attempts to deny that. Instead, it offers the zone of nonbeing, non-appearance as human beings. The racially dominant group presumes self-justified reality (license), which means it doesn’t call itself into question. And the designated racially inferior group? Lacking justification, their access to being is illegitimate. This means their absence is a mark of the system’s legitimacy. Such groups face the Catch 22 of illegitimate appearance: To appear is to violate appearance. Put differently, the violation is one of appearing without a license to do such. To all this, a consideration that should be added is this: The human being comes to the fore through emerging from being in the first place. Thus, the assertion of Being, as in the thought of Heidegger and his followers is also an effort to push the human being out of existence, so to speak. Heidegger, fair enough in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947/1971), saw no problem in this. Fanon (1952), and many others in Africana philosophy, including the South African philosopher and psychologist Noël Chabani Manganyi (1973, 1977), disagreed through showing how racial conflict is also an existential one in which an existential ontology is posed against an ontology of being. The latter, we submit, is best suited for gods. When such becomes the model of being human, humanity dies. Blacks thus face the paradox of existing (standing out, living – as ex sistere means such) as non-existence (not standing out). Antiblack racism makes black appearance illicit.

Licit appearance would mean appearing as selves and others. It would mean the right to appear. Antiracist struggles will not work, then, as a struggle against otherness. It is, instead, against being non-selves and non-others.

Returning to the Afropessmistic notion of blackness as social death, I’m compelled to ask: Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count as social perspectives? If the question of racism is a function of unequal power, which it clearly is, why not offer a study of power, how it is gained and lost, instead of an assertion of its manifestations as ontological?

I’m reminded here of Victor Anderson’s (1995) Beyond Ontological Blackness. Anderson would no doubt object that Afropessimism treats ‘blackness’ as an ontological, which makes it a self-sustaining (non-relational) concept. The historical emergence of blackness refutes that. But more, there is a logical paradox that emerges from ontological blackness. To identify blackness, one must be in a relation to it. This relational matter requires looking beyond blackness ironically in order to understand blackness. This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, and fixed into the grammar of how meaning is produced.

Consider the grammar of gender. Women historically occupy the role of absence (de Beauvoir, 1949; Butler, 2011; Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997). Blackness and womanness are thus intimate (Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997). The grammar of presence and absence is peculiarly theodicean (Gordon, 2010, 2013). This is the form of mauvaise-foi in which presence takes on the hubris of the desire to be a (often the) god. Theodicy defends the integrity of the god (systemic maintenance) through placing its contradictions (for example, evil) outside of it. The result is Being as a form of systemic purity (Monahan, 2011, 2017). This grammar is also psychoanalytical, in the sense of existential psychoanalysis. Manichean ‘qualities’ (such as ‘hard’ masculinity and ‘soft’ femininity) are evident in these modes of being. This pertains as well to sexual orientation: A white man’s relation to a black man is not only one of race-to-race but also of race-to-gender where the meaning of being black (as ‘feminine’ and ‘sexual’) could collapse into gendered absence. And extended to the sexualization of absence – think of the plethora of literature on the feminine as soft, cold, dark, and absence. The relation among males in which one group manifests such qualities immediately collapses into a homoerotic one (Fanon, 1952; Gordon, 1995/1999, 1997, 2000).

We see here a conception of dealing with racial and gender qualities that are today called ‘intersectional’, though that metaphor doesn’t at first quite work for their existential phenomenological psychoanalytical manifestations in mauvaise-foi (because purity seeks singularity). The major proponent of intersectionality – Kimberlé Crenshaw – is pretty clear that she is referring to identity collisions as they appear in law (especially tort and discrimination law); in other words, she is referring to harms that, because of how they are interpreted, don’t appear (supposedly don’t exist) despite their lived-reality. She often illustrates her point through her famous example of a collision at a four-way intersection (Crenshaw, 1991, 2014). If the fundamental site of harm is property, the concern will be about the cars, and if their status of property depends on being owned by, say, white men, then harm would pertain to them. If the location of harm expands simply to ‘whites’, then a white woman or man in one of the cars would be sufficient for harm having occurred. If, however, there were no whites in the cars, then the conclusion would be that no one was harmed. If harm extends to blacks and other people of color, and even further, to non-human animals, then any of them being in the car or cars would initiate a cause for redress. Notice that Crenshaw’s argument doesn’t deny the possibility of white men being harmed. Her point is that people such as black women were not historically acknowledged in the legal frameworks of harmed subjects because of a failure to see that human beings do not manifest a single category of identity on which to build a legal response. Simply referring to ‘man’ as the exemplar of human being fails to acknowledge that human beings are not only men but also women, and simply as ‘women’ fails to address what kind of women such as those of color and different sexual orientations.

At an existential level, what is also missed is the lived-reality of the convergence of these and their social and legal implications. A black woman in an automobile collision is, for example, not just harmed but also harmed in ways linked to the wider legal framework of the society. The criminalization of black women and men, for instance, could mean that though harmed in the collision, such people may face the possibility of entanglement in a legal system that treats them as the cause of harm, which could lead to other dangers such as ensnarement in the criminal justice system. This is one of the reasons why, even when harmed, many people of color don’t seek the aid of law enforcement and other representatives of that system. Crenshaw’s theory therefore has an existential and phenomenological significance in that it is an argument for the appearance of what is otherwise treated as either non-existent or not worthy of appearing, of, that is, illicit appearance. Her theory is also about the radicalization of appearance in that the identified subjects emerge, so to speak, not only in terms of being seen but also through an effort to see what they see or experience – in short, to see or at least understand their point of view in terms of the conditions they face. It is thus not a subjective theory or a narrowly objective one but instead an intersubjective theory because it requires understanding how different human beings relate to and encounter legal structures – products of the human world – as simultaneously alienating and enabling.

Crenshaw’s concept of an intersection could, however, be interpreted in problematic ways. The first is the geometric model of an intersection. That version presupposes well-formed or complete lines converging. A response would be that there was never a complete ‘whole’ or, as the feminist phenomenological communicologist Sara Ahmed (2006) would put it, ‘straight line’ with regard to human subjects in the first place. The queer phenomenological theorist David Ross Fryer (2008), in stream with Ahmed, offers the logical conclusion of this critique – namely, a fundamental queerness at the heart of race theory and related areas of study such as gender studies and queer theory. My recent work in philosophy of culture extends such a concern to the human condition as well – that is, the upsurge from being makes human reality a queer one. This is pretty much the argument articulated earlier with regard to questions raised by Fanon’s analysis of ontology, existential ontology, and the dialectics of selves and others.

The second critical consideration is that as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning, the question of identity requires more than an intersecting model, otherwise there will simply be one (a priori) normative outcome in every moment of inquiry: Whoever manifests the maximum manifestation of predetermined negative intersecting terms. That would in effect be an essence before an existence – indeed, before an actual event of harm. Some race theorists’ tendency to build their arguments on a particular group as ‘most oppressed’ without offering evidence for the continued truth of such a claim is an example of this fallacy. This observation emerges as well where pessimism is the guiding attitude. An existential critique would be that optimism and pessimism are symptomatic of the same attitude: a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental, which means that the social world at hand is a manifestation of choices and relationships – in other words, human actions. As human beings can only build the future instead of it determining us, the task at hand depends on commitment – what is to be done without guarantees of outcome. This concern also pertains to the initial concerns about authenticity. One could only be pessimistic about an outcome, an activity. It’s an act of forecasting what could only be meaningful once actually performed. Similarly, one could only be optimistic about the same. What, however, if there were no way to know either? Here we come to the foi element in mauvaise foi. Some actions are deontological, and if not that, they are at least reflections of our commitments, our projects. Thus, the point of some actions isn’t about their success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing (Fanon, 1961/ 1991; Gordon, 2015). Taking responsibility for such actions – bringing value to them – is opposed to another manifestation of mauvaise-foi: the spirit of seriousness.

# 1nr

### Contingency---1nr

#### Political optimism is good for black health — progress is verified by data and believing in a better future improves quality of life.

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Is Pessimism the Only Sensible or Empirically Warranted Response in these Two Arenas?

It is easy to find evidence to support pessimism about American racial dynamics or the societal deployment of genomic science. The United States is notorious for its racially- and ethnically-inflected poverty and excessive levels of incarceration; undocumented migrants live in legal limbo; new genomics techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 tempt humankind into hubristic manipulation of nature, and scientists’ promises to cure cancer through genetics knowledge ring hollow to many. The question for this article is whether there are also strong grounds for optimism in my two illustrative realms, such that one could plausibly and persuasively choose to be “centered on advancement concerns” rather than “centered on security concerns.”

The answer is yes. Again I can point only to illustrative, suggestive evidence. First, the gap between blacks’ and whites’ life expectancy declined from seven years in 1990 to 3.4 years in 2014. That is an astonishing, perhaps unprecedented, rate of change given the usual slow pace of demographic transformation. It is important in itself, of course, and also as a summary statement about an array of other social phenomena in which racial disparities are declining. Blacks are living longer mainly because of declining rates of homicides, HIV mortality, infant mortality, cancer and heart disease, and suicide among black men.19 A lot of things have to go right for a group’s life expectancy to rise rapidly.

Second, applications for U.S. citizenship rose from the previous year in ten of the fifteen years from 2000 to 2015, while declining in four (and remaining stable in one). That is an important indicator of immigrant incorporation, and especially relevant to politica scientists because “Hispanics and Asians who are naturalized citizens tend to have higher voter turnout rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.” 20

Third, non-white Americans themselves tend to feel pretty good about their lives. Gallup Poll asked in 2016, “Where do you expect your life satisfaction to be in five years?” If whites’ response is standardized at 1, then blacks are at 2.97, and Hispanics at 1.29. Only Asian Americans, at 0.97, were less optimistic than whites. Gallup also asked about one’s level of stress in the previous day. If whites are again standardized at 1, then blacks are at 0.48; Hispanics at 0.53; and Asian Americans at 0.75. Middle-class blacks were half as likely as middle class whites to report stress during the previous day.21

In the arena of genomics also, one can point to grounds for optimism rather than pessimism. The Innocence Project, “dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice,” has enabled about 350 people to be released from prison. (Not so parenthetically, seven out of ten are African American or Latino, mostly poor men.) More extensive DNA testing might lead to many more exonerations; one careful analysis of serious crime convictions found that “in five percent of homicide and sexual assault cases DNA testing eliminated the convicted offender as the source of incriminating physical evidence.” Previous estimates had pegged the share of wrongful convictions at no more than one to two percent.22 More generally, “DNA profiling [of convicted felons] reduces the probability of future convictions by 17% for serious violent offenders and by 6% for serious property offenders .... These are likely underestimates of the true deterrent effect of DNA profiling.” 23

Genomic scientists can point to impressive successes with regard to Mendelian (single-gene) diseases, and they focus even more on diagnoses and cures yet to come. Eric Lander, director of the Broad Institute, likens the trajectory of genomic medicine to the development of medicine based on the germ theory of disease, which “took about 75 years. With genomics, we’re maybe halfway through that cycle.” In his view, “the rate of progress is just stunning. As costs continue to come down, we are entering a period where we are going to be able to get the complete catalogue of disease genes.” Cancer is a prime target, almost in sight:“If you understand that this is a game of probability, and there is only a finite number of cancer cells and each has only a certain chance of mutating, and if we can put together two or three independent attacks on the cancer cell, we win. If we invest vigorously in this and we attract the best young people into this field, we get it done in a generation. If we don’t, it takes two generations.” Lander is “not Pollyanna .... [I]t’s not for next year. We play for the long game. I don’t want to overpromise in the short term, but it is incredibly exciting if you take the 25-year view.” 24

This is a classic statement of optimism, or being centered on advancement concerns. It begins with expertise and perspective, sees dangers and weaknesses, and nonetheless asserts empirical grounds for faith. President Obama’s insistence that “if you had to choose a moment in human history to live ... you’d choose now” has the same quality. My point is not that left pessimism is wrong—only that there are grounds, perhaps equally strong, for left optimism. One can choose either, and then find good evidence for that choice.

Why Is Left Pessimism Problematic?

That wily politician, Barney Frank, offers the best answer from the vantage point of the public arena: “When you tell your supporters that nothing has gotten better, and that any concessions you’ve received are mere tokenism, you take away their incentive to stay mobilized. As for those you’re negotiating with, if you denigrate anything they concede as worthless, they will soon realize they can obtain the same response by giving nothing at all.” 25

One can offer the same type of answer from the vantage point of a teacher. Many of us have had the experience of teaching a course—about civil war, inequality and politics, environmental policy, or the meaning of liberty—only to have our students politely request on the last day of class some idea or piece of information about which they can feel good or which they can use in their public engagement. We need to offer answers. Optimism may also be associated with academic success; one careful study found that “although achievement in mathematics was most strongly related to prior achievement and grade level, optimism and pessimism were significant factors. In particular, students with a more generally pessimistic outlook on life had a lower level of achievement in mathematics over time.” 26A study of college students similarly found that “dispositional and academic optimism were associated with less chance of dropping out of college, as well as better motivation and adjustment. Academic optimism was also associated with higher grade point average.” 27

And for those of us of a certain age, it is heartening to discover that “after adjusting for covariates, the results suggested that greater optimism [among middle-aged, predominantly white Americans] was associated with greater high-density lipoprotein cholesterol and lower triglycerides .... In conclusion, ... optimism is associated with a healthy lipid profile; moreover, these associations can be explained, in part, by the presence of healthier behaviors and a lower body mass index.” 28

#### Furthermore, their attempt to universalize an ontological category of blackness is American exceptionalism ― transcribing American experiences to the world is colonialist and delegitimizes African epistemologies of resistance

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The conceptual-geopolitical trappings of "1865" fundamentally define the discourse of "Afro-Pessimism and the Ends of Redemption," like assorted neo-pessimist texts: "The expanding field of Afro-pessimism theorises [sic] the structural relation between Blackness and Humanity as an irreconcilable encounter, an antagonism. One cannot know Blackness as distinct from slavery, for there is no Black temporality which is antecedent to the temporality of the Black slave."25 Critically, Wole Soyinka details "pre-colonial" African languages of "black" self-identification from the Yoruba to the Ga to the Hausa peoples on continent, for starters, in "The African World and the Ethnocultural Debate" (1989). But these details do not enter modern Eurocentric discussions in the main, be they Marxist or anti-Marxist, etc.26 There is in Wilderson only the slaver's history of slavery—one slaver's official "national" or state history and discourse. The "expanding field" of "Afro-pessimism" (2.0) further expands anti-Black, anti-African conceptions of historical agency. There is nothing outside of, or before, or countering Wilderson's "slavery" for the African enslaved. There is only Wilderson's "Blackness," which is curious. For what he casts as "Black" rather than "black" is more accurately cast as "negro" (in this specifically English usage, moreover, with no memory of the Spanish or Portuguese etymology) and not even "Negro," quiet as it's kept—since all of Africa is flatly foreclosed by this acutely paradoxical "Afro-pessimism." Both Africa and diasporas eclipsed, his "Blackness" and "Human Life" turn out to be the blackness and humanism of white Americanism, specifically and restrictively, an isolationist or exceptionalist Americanism despite the past and present hegemony of white Western humanism and its "anti-Black racism" worldwide. What is the "Afro" in "Afro-pessimism," therefore, when this Afro-pessimism (2.0) revivifies in disguise the "negro" concept of white settler-slave state history and historiography? It ironically does so in the name of some "Blackness" itself or, rather, the "blackness" of whiteness, of white postulation—not the Blackness of Blackness or the transvaluations of manifold Black liberation movements themselves, even as it blithely misappropriates the ongoing if now naturalized cultural-political labor of that historic Blackness in the upper case. A dominant Anglo-American discourse of slavery is all that there is and ever was now when it comes to the Black and African, all anti-slavery discourses and counter-discourses of slavery as well as Blackness somehow vanished. A glaring absence of Black radical and revolutionary intellectual history should be expected from any expression of "Afro-pessimism." Indeed, could Afro-pessimism 2.0 take hold as another trend in mainstream academia except in the political void produced after the 1960s and '70s by local as well as global counter-revolution and counter-insurgency? This absence affects the shape and agenda of the critical analysis of "anti-Black racism" in essential ways. Wilderson's critique of the "ruse of analogy" in Red, White & Black becomes a refrain that naturalizes academic approaches to politics now institutionalized with the continued reign of Western bourgeois liberalism. For older and enduring Black radical perspectives, the existence of "anti-Black racism" among non-Black peoples, organizations, and movements is neither a new nor shocking phenomenon. For many Black revolutionary movement logics of the '60s and '70s, for instance, this did not preclude alliance (or the exhaustion of alliances made) or lead to a doctrinaire rejection of "solidarity" work and its international (or "intercommunal") possibilities.27 "Contradictions" were expected, so to speak, in theory and practice, which might be resolved or not, depending on material interest, circumstance, etc. For them, this work was not about gauging identity, or the perfection of a projected analogy, but mobilization for the political accomplishments of revolution—a revolutionism that could or may not work toward the development of a new humanism not white or racist or anti-Black after all. The reach for potential solidarities was not construed as a gift or an act of good-willed benevolence, wise or unwise given the risks. Even solidarity work with obviously problematic, openly enemy forces could be a strategic or tactical mode of advancing Black collective self-interests that might dispense with any alliance at any given moment in time without seeing the relationship as a statement of some total identity or non-identity of condition and interests. The notion of solidarity has nowadays been superficialized, remaining riveted on mere rhetorical proclamation and aesthetic or representational identification in neo-colonial culture industries here and there. An older, praxical approach to alliance, perhaps "analogy," and solidarity is not taken up by current analyses of identity conflicts that prevail with the resurgence of a more academic political-intellectualism and a now much less contested liberalism. This is imperial "multiculturalism" and its malcontents. As much as Afro-pessimism (2.0) may object to certain instances of liberalism, or [End Page 292] regulation white racist liberalism at least, it assumes these Western epistemic frameworks of white academic liberalism all the same, thereby ensconcing the colonialism and neo-colonialism it constantly and symptomatically denegates in text after text. Black anti-colonialism / anti-colonialist Blackness The great anti-colonialist poet of Négritude, Aimé Césaire wrote famously in his letter of resignation from the French Communist Party that he wanted Marxism and communism to be placed in the service of Black peoples and not Black peoples in the service of Marxism or communism. He maintained in 1956: "it is clear that our struggle—the struggle of colonial peoples against colonialism, the struggle of peoples of color against racism—is more complex, or better yet, of a completely different nature than the fight of the French worker against French capitalism, and it cannot in any way be considered a part, a fragment, of that struggle."28 As always, he was writing on behalf of Black people who were, proverbially, the only people on the planet who have been excluded from the "human race" by the "modern" history of Western racism and colonialism which obstructs "a true humanism—a humanism made to the measure of the world."29 What is this Négritude if not Blackness, Black anti-colonialism, or anti-colonial Blackness? This tradition is not a tradition in Wilderson who regularly critiques the analogical arrogance of Marxism, feminism, and an academic paradigm of "post-colonialism" with less common reference to "queer" or "gay and lesbian" categories of analysis as well—all in the name of pessimism. For him, none of these political frameworks with their privileged identarian subjects can capture the condition of "Blackness" and "slavery" (or "the Black/Slave"). While that perspective can allow for some insights—ones certainly seen before around the Black world and ones certainly avoided by so much institutional scholarship—it leaves the general categorical grid of established Western political epistemologies intact. The familiar academic terrain of "race, gender, class, and sexuality" frames the critique for "Blackness" of "gender, class, and sexuality" in addition to "post-coloniality" or "post-colonialism." The most conventional US academic categories of identity and analysis are still rendered in full as discrete, monolithic, and monological categories and referents (e.g., workers, women, etc.), like the respective political ideologies based upon them in the traditional ideological history of the white West (e.g., Marxism, feminism, etc.). There are "workers" and then there are "women," generically, and then sometimes there are "gays" by whatever name, not to mention "natives" or the colonized in this culturally specific epistemology of a specific culture of colonialism itself. The upshot is quite conservative, even anachronistically so. This critique is an internal if damning critique embodying and encouraging pessimism largely from within the established order of knowledge that it analytically engages and categorically replenishes and preserves. The grid politics of Wilderson's critique of "the ruse of analogy" leaves all manner of "Blackness" in a wasteland. The routine categorical contrast with "Native Americans" reduces all that and any colonial condition to a startlingly oversimplified matter of "land" (or "land restoration"); and it occludes "Afro-Indian" history as well as "Red-Black" maroonage all across the Americas. The constant generic contrast with "feminism" or "non-Black women" eclipses the more mammoth criticism of "gender" writ large in Diop and Amadiume's Black-African studies of Europe or "Western Civilization" as a "racial patriarchy" of pessimism and "anti-Black" imperialism. The contrast with Marxism and its "workers" never resurrects any issues of "class" or economics from any other perspective to recognize or to resist, for example, the white invention of Black elites as vital instruments of racism, anti-Blackness, and white-supremacism. There never appears a trace of any critique of Black "social class' (or political class) elitism in "Afro-pessimism" (2.0), which is a tell-tale sign of petty-bourgeois or "lumpen-bourgeois" articulations. Lastly, Wilderson's occasional categorical contrast of "Blackness" with Palestinians or al-Nakba (which aligns in Arabic with the Swahili substitution for the term "Middle Passage"—Maafa, the "Catastrophe") comprehends no Blackness in Palestine or among Palestinians. His Afro-pessimism can envision no Afro-Palestinianism, unlike a great tradition of Pan-African discourses that also do not dislocate Palestine from an anti-colonialist mapping of the African continent or the Afro-Asian landmass of a Pan-Africanist and "Bandung" imagination, one powerfully shared by Malcolm X and Fayez A. Sayegh. For "Black Power" internationally, Kwame Ture would refer to Palestine as the "tip of Africa" and uphold Fatima Bernawi, the iconic Black woman who's been named the "first Palestinian female political prisoner," as the paragon of "Black and Palestinian Revolutions."30 She is likewise canonized by other Afro-Palestinian icons themselves, such as Ali Jiddeh and Mahmoud Jiddeh of the African community of the Old City of Jerusalem, for example—or, say, Ahmad and Jumaa Takrouri of Occupied Jericho—who are each among the greatest of all icons across Historic Palestine, a country which has produced multiple Black Panther formations in Hebrew as well as Arabic in the 1970s and the 1980s. Again, Wilderson tacitly "nationalizes" his category of "Blackness" although this is scarcely in the interests of Black people in or outside of the US colonized mainland of Americanism; and so none of the above "Blackness" survives the critical grid of a very Anglo-American (and white racist state-bound) critique of "analogy," regardless of the "Afro-pessimist" text at hand. Do not the vulgar colonial-nativist politics of Incognegro's strangely overlooked comment on "West Indians" go full blown then in Red, White & Black and elsewhere?31 There is here a general critical erasure of the massive tradition of Black anti-colonialism—or anti-colonial Black resistance to "anti-Blackness" and anti-Black colonialism, which transcends nationalization. Wilderson's "Afro-pessimist" rejects the anti-colonialist paradigms of supposedly "other" peoples, and yet in a manner that reinstates US or Western coloniality nonetheless—a white colonialism that oppresses "the Black" inside and outside the United States's official geopolitical limits. This position can thus make a virtue out of automatic and absolute anti-alliance postures with no further, actual political action then required for Black people, "the Black critic," or any Black liberation struggle on this view. Such chauvinism without political commitment or engagement beyond critique is logically consistent, for pessimism, where mere resentment or ressentiment can masquerade as resistance or "pro-Black" "radicalism." After all, Afro-pessimism (2.0) begins with a proud suspicion of Black liberation or Black liberation movement, itself, no less than of its potentially "anti-racist" or "anti-Black" political alliances. This provincial "American" pessimism reveals more affinities with Créolite in the Caribbean than Césaire's anti-colonialist eruption of Pan-African Négritude, in reality, its narrowly and negatively delimited rhetoric of the "Blackness" of "the Black" (as "Slave," of course) notwithstanding. As if this too is a virtue, pessimism is not just suspicious of power but possibility—while, upholding dystopia, it is casually dismissive of all historical actuality that does not support a pessimist paradigm, orientation or sensibility. Analytically, moreover, there is somehow no white colonialism for Blacks to fight in Africa or Black countries of Black people anywhere and no terrible landlessness that afflicts the African diasporas of Blackness captive within white settler and/or imperial state formations, for Wilderson and Afro-pessimism (2.0).